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FORMING STANDING JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Forces Group or a composite staff-has significant drawbacks. A Special Forces Group is not trained or manned to operate as a headquarters at the sub-unified command level, and composite staffs require substantial time working together to be highly effective.
This paper looks at an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters to cause minimal disruption of the TSOC staff, even during times of crisis, and avoid the pitfalls inherent in composite staffs and under-resourced subordinate headquarters. The recommendation is to establish a standing JSOTF headquarters within each TSOC. Discussed in detail is an analysis of the major benefits and drawbacks of the proposal, a look at some alternative and interim solutions, and suggestions for an organizational structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters.
The first point of discussion is the fundamental question of how a standing JSOTF headquarters would improve SOF command and control and why it is preferable to the current method of organizing a JSOTF headquarters. The next section examines which headquarters a standing JSOTF headquarters should fall under, concluding with the recommendation that it should be imbedded within the TSOC. Also included in this chapter is information on Special
Operations Detachments (SODs), a new program designed to provide temporary augmentation for the TSOCs with National Guard personnel. Following this is a recommended structure for a standing JSOTF headquarters and includes a description of each staff directorate and the senior staff positions. Included throughout this chapter is the functional relationship between the standing JSOTF headquarters and the TSOC staff. The final section presents a summary and some concluding thoughts.
Before continuing, it is important to understand at what command level a standing JSOTF headquarters is designed to operate. As mentioned earlier, the senior SOF commander, also known as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) establishes a JSOTF as a sub-unified component command to control all SOF under a unified command, such as a JTF. 3 This is the appropriate level to utilize a standing JSOTF headquarters.
JSOTFs, however, can be established at various levels of command and vary greatly in size and complexity of mission. For example, Special Operations Command -Central (SOCCENT) currently supports two JSOTFs: JSOTF-Afghanistan, with a headquarters element numbering well over one hundred personnel, and a JSOTF headquarters in Djibouti with less than 50.
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SOCCENT presently does not serve as a JSOTF but has delegated that to subordinate elements. If standing JSOTF headquarters existed today, SOCCENT might utilize it to run JSOTF-Afghanistan; conversely, a standing JSOTF headquarters would be an unnecessary use of limited resources in Djibouti. To reiterate, a standing JSOTF headquarters, as it is discussed in this paper, is designed to serve as the staff core of a JSOTF at the sub-unified, component command level.
STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS JUSTIFICATION
JSOTF headquarters can be formed in a number of ways. The most common is to use the TSOC staff as the core with the remaining positions filled by augmentees. Another method is to form the headquarters out of a totally composite staff. Additionally, the core of the JSOTF headquarters can come from a SOF service unit, such as a Special Forces Group or Naval Special Warfare Group. In all cases, substantial augmentation is necessary to round out the JSOTF headquarters. A standing JSOTF headquarters reduces the shortcomings of these methods and improves SOF command and control during a crisis.
The TSOC staff faces several challenges when it forms the core of a JSOTF headquarters. As the JSOTF nucleus, it must rapidly integrate a large number of augmentees from a variety of sources and meld them into a highly effective organization. Simultaneously, the TSOC must continue to support SOF throughout the theater. This is exceptionally difficult when most of the TSOC staff is fully engaged in support of JSOTF operations. top mission, the war on terrorism. 13 The SECDEF proposed that USSOCOM grow by 4,000
personnel along with a budget increase of approximately $5 billion over the next five years.
14 Unfortunately, additional funding alone will not increase the number of SOF, and there is no indication that the cap on the number of military personnel will rise. This means that the 4,000 SOF spaces must come from existing DOD billets. Even with the available spaces, it takes time to recruit and train SOF personnel. It is a "SOF Truth," first penned by General (ret)
Peter Schoomaker, former commander of USSOCOM, that "SOF are not mass produced."
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Considering that it takes a minimum of 18 months to complete initial training for a Special
Forces Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), and the difficulty of finding and recruiting the appropriate soldiers, it could easily be five years or more before the 4,000 personnel increase is realized in the field.
Despite these challenges, the substantial growth of SOF makes the concept of standing JSOTF headquarters feasible. The service members that would man the standing JSOTF headquarters are senior personnel. They must come from the existing SOF and conventional force. Most of the initial pain of fielding standing JSOTF headquarters would be felt at the various SOF headquarters since this is where the majority of the senior personnel necessary for a standing JSOTF are located. But this situation is only temporary, and as the force matures, personnel backfill those taken to form the standing JSOTF headquarters. This is an inevitable situation when forming a new organization requiring a core of experienced personnel. When the 3d SFG formed in 1990, the initial NCO cadre was drawn from the existing Special Forces Groups. 16 It was a painful experience at the time, but in the long run, it improved SOF capability. Fielding standing JSOTF headquarters will be similarly painful and take time. The benefit, though, of having highly effective SOF command and control at the sub-unified command level on day one of a conflict will be well worth the cost.
STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS LOCATION
Standing JSOTF headquarters could exist at a variety of locations; imbedded within the TSOC, in a Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters, in the combatant commander's staff, or at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The argument given earlier to justify forming standing JSOTF headquarters generally focused on the case when the standing JSOTF headquarters is imbedded in the TSOC. This section covers in more detail that course of action, but also looks at the advantages and disadvantages of the other options. Each has unique characteristics and warrants discussion.
THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS IMBEDDED IN THE TSOC
Imbedding the standing JSOTF headquarters in the TSOC provides the most effective transition from the peacetime regional security and cooperation operations of a TSOC to its wartime role as the SOF component command. Doctrinally, the TSOC is expected to fulfill this role; however, the TSOCs are not adequately manned to do so without significant augmentation. 
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Participation in the planning and execution of these exercises would be training opportunities for the standing JSOTF headquarters, and allow the TSOC staff to focus on other tasks. Serving as the JSOTF on a major exercise, the standing JSOTF headquarters would provide a dedicated staff whose effort was not diluted by the constantly emerging issues that face the TSOC staff and tend to push exercises down in priority of effort.
When imbedded in the TSOC, the standing JSOTF headquarters staff and the TSOC commander would know each other well and work effectively together. The commander would provide direct guidance and see the staff every day. This relationship is especially critical in the early days of a crisis when the operational picture is developing. It is during this period that the standing JSOTF headquarters would be most beneficial. When the TSOC commander assumes command of the JSOTF, he would be totally familiar with the JSOTF staff. The staff would also know the commander, and they would be completely focused on the JSOTF mission, with no distractions from other SOF operations in theater. Regionally oriented, and providing direct support to the TSOC commander during peace and war, no other location for the standing JSOTF headquarters affords all these benefits.
There is, however, a risk that the TSOC might over-task the standing JSOTF headquarters, or disperse the personnel among the existing TSOC staff sections. This may happen when an over-worked, undermanned TSOC assigns additional duties to the standing JSOTF headquarters. This could greatly help the TSOC support its daily requirements, but it would also degrade the standing JSOTF headquarters' ability to plan, coordinate, and train to execute its primary mission of serving as a JSOTF headquarters. Equally harmful would be parceling out the standing JSOTF headquarters personnel to the TSOC staff sections. If this happens, the standing JSOTF headquarters could not train effectively. The standing JSOTF headquarters staff would become essential assets within the TSOC staff, and removing them to stand-up a JSOTF would cause the same level of disruption in the TSOC that it currently experiences when the JSOTF is activated. This situation is most likely to occur in commands that perceive a low probability of activating the JSOTF, and are willing to accept the risk to accomplish their day to day tasks. To mitigate these risks, USSOCOM must clearly define the mission of the standing JSOTF headquarters, while the TSOC commander assigns specific tasks and provides supervision.
THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS IN A STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS OR COMBATANT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
This section looks first at a standing JSOTF headquarters imbedded in a regional Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters. Later, it examines the case of a standing JSOTF headquarters assigned to the combatant commander's staff. This analysis assumes that all or most regional combatant commands will have a SJTF headquarters. While this is not a forgone conclusion, it is stated as a "goal" in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
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Placing the standing JSOTF headquarters in the SJTF headquarters provides the best continuity between these two staff elements, and could be very advantageous when the JTF and JSOTF are activated. The standing JSOTF headquarters, in this case, would be an integral part of the SJTF headquarters during peacetime and crisis. This relationship reduces stress and friction during crisis situations and aids in planning and interoperability. It would help ensure that SOF planning was completely nested in JTF planning. Since both the SJTF headquarters and the standing JSOTF headquarters would be focused on the same goal of JTF operational effectiveness during a crisis, there is little possibility that the standing JSOTF headquarters would be siphoned off or diverted to support other activities.
Of course many of the advantages of placing the standing JSOTF headquarters under the TSOC disappear with this course of action. Interface with the TSOC staff and commander will be less when the standing JSOTF headquarters is assigned to the SJTF headquarters. Staffing of SOF plans would be more complex. Undoubtedly, the TSOC commander will continue to be responsible for theater SOF planning, just as he is now. 24 If the standing JSOTF headquarters leads SOF campaign and contingency planning, their work will have to be routed through a cumbersome path traveling from the standing JSOTF headquarters to the TSOC, possibly back again to the SJTF headquarters, and finally to the combatant command staff. Another issue is the standing JSOTF headquarters chain of command. If assigned to the SJTF headquarters, these personnel would be rated by the SJTF and combatant command chain. While not an impossible situation, it is undesirable since the standing JSOTF headquarters will directly support TSOC peacetime planning requirements, and during crisis, the JSOTF will fall under the operational control of the TSOC commander.
Placing the standing JSOTF headquarters in the combatant commander's staff is an option, particularly if no SJTF were assigned to the theater. This scenario has essentially the same advantages and disadvantages as assigning the standing JSOTF headquarters to a SJTF. Coordination, though, would be directly with the combatant commander's staff. This could cause significant problems for the TSOC commander when SOF plans reach the combatant commander without his knowledge or approval.
THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS WITHIN USSOCOM
Rather than locating standing JSOTF headquarters within regional headquarters, operations" is undefined in number or size of operation, it is clear that USSOCOM must be prepared to support at least two overlapping major conflicts. A third standing JSOTF headquarters would provide the ability to support an additional SSC requiring a sub-unified SOF command.
A pool of three standing JSOTF headquarters would give USSOCOM a level of flexibility not found in any other course of action. Each standing JSOTF headquarters would be regionally oriented based on USSOCOM priorities, which USSOCOM can adjust at any time.
USSOCOM could apply more than one standing JSOTF headquarters to a region. In situations where USSOCOM is the supported command in the war on terrorism, the command could establish a Joint Task Force formed around the standing JSOTF headquarters to prosecute terrorist networks that cross combatant command regional boundaries.
While providing great flexibility and conserving resources, this course of action sacrifices the cohesion present with standing JSOTF headquarters assigned to the TSOCs. Standing JSOTF headquarters at USSOCOM, even when regionally aligned, will not have the same level of regional expertise as those at TSOCs. Regional priorities at USSOCOM may change. The standing JSOTF headquarters at the TSOCs will always focus on their region and have a complete understanding of the SOF campaign and contingency plans. This depth of knowledge of regional SOF plans and geographic and cultural issues might be critical, especially at the outset of a crisis.
LOCATION OF THE STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS: CONCLUSION
Imbedding the standing JSOTF headquarters in the TSOC would give the TSOC commander a great tool during peacetime and crisis. The standing JSOTF headquarters would conduct SOF contingency and campaign planning, and plan and run major joint exercises; both of which allow the TSOC staff to better focus on SOF security and cooperation operations. A known quantity to the TSOC commander and staff, it would serve effectively as the core of a JSOTF headquarters from the very beginning of a crisis. Finally, USSOCOM will still retain the option to move a standing JSOTF headquarters from one theater to support operations in another. The TSOC, though, must resist the temptation to over-task the standing JSOTF headquarters or disperse its personnel into the TSOC staff. If that happens, much of the benefit of a standing JSOTF headquarters would be lost.
AN INTERIM SOLUTION NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENTS
USSOCOM has a program in place that provides augmentation to the TSOCs. The personnel come from the Army National Guard, with an Air Guard component to be added in the near future, and are formed into elements called Special Operations Detachments (SOD). 
SOD-C (Central), SOD-E (Europe), SOD-J (Joint), SOD-S (South), SOD-P (Pacific), and SOD-K (Korea). Four SODs have already been mobilized with SOD-C and SOD-S to Central
Command, SOD-J to the 5th Special Forces Group, and SOD-E to the 10th Special Forces Command. SODs do, however, give the TSOC commander a staff element that can serve as the core of a JSOTF, augment existing JSOTF staff, or backfill deployed TSOC personnel.
SODs do not take the place of standing JSOTF headquarters, but they are available now.
Standing JSOTF headquarters have numerous hurdles to overcome before they will be fielded.
While the Secretary of Defense has ordered aides to redesign USSOCOM from a "blank sheet"
to better fight the war on terrorism, resolving standing JSOTF headquarters personnel and budget issues may take several years, even if the concept of standing JSOTF headquarters is approved. 30 Adding personnel to the TSOC Joint Manning Document could be a two year process. Standing JSOTF headquarters are not in the current USSOCOM budget and it could be two years or more before they are incorporated into the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and receive funding. 31 Until then, SODs provide a trained staff to the TSOCs and will continue to be valuable assets even when standing JSOTF headquarters are in place.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A STANDING JSOTF HEADQUARTERS
The purpose of a standing JSOTF headquarters is to serve as the nucleus of the JSOTF As the TSOCs SOF campaign and contingency planner for the combatant commander, the standing JSOTF headquarters will conduct complex joint planning and interface with the combatant commander's staff and interagency personnel. The standing JSOTF headquarters staff, then, will be small in number but comprise senior officers and NCO's. In any of these situations, the JSOTF commander will be a flag officer and prepared to interface with his fellow component commanders, the combatant commander, and senior coalition officers. The DCG would be available to command a second JSOTF if another Joint Task Force were activated. In the case of two JSOTFs, the TSOC commander would likely choose to command the JSOTF in the theaters' main effort.
Ideally in a unit, the commander and his deputy are not the same rank. Changing the TSOC commander to a two-star position would resolve this problem. Considering the greater role of SOF in the war on terrorism and the corresponding importance of the TSOCs, a strong argument could be made that TSOC commands should be two-star positions. However, that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Units exist in which the commander and his deputy are the same rank. The most obvious example, though not the only one, is the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief, both four-star positions.
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The peacetime activities of the standing JSOTF headquarters would rarely demand a large part of the DCG's attention. The preponderance of his focus will be on his duties as the 
J-1 Manpower and Personnel
Manpower planning requirements for the standing JSOTF headquarters would be minimal.
The J-1 will assist the Operations directorate in reviewing, modifying or developing the TPFDD.
The J-1 will also provide routine administrative support to the members of the standing JSOTF headquarters, including the submission of standard personnel reports and awards.
J-5 Plans and Policy
As mentioned earlier, the J-5 will assist the plans cell of the Operations directorate.
Commander's Special Staff
The commander's special staff consists of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), the Public Affairs Office (PAO), the Chaplain, and the Surgeon. While not present in the standing JSOTF headquarters, the special staff will provide input for SOF campaign and contingency planning.
They also would provide routine support to the standing JSOTF personnel.
Headquarters Commandant
This individual will remain in the TSOC until the JSOTF is activated. The Deputy
Commanding General may, however, appoint one of the standing JSOTF headquarters members as interim commandant to monitor daily activities.
JSOTF Liaison Element
This element is established when the JSOTF is activated.
Command Senior Enlisted Advisor (CSEA)
The CSEA will remain with the TSOC CG. When the TSOC commander assumes command of the JSOTF, the CSEA will be there with him. Until then, the Operations SGM in the Operations directorate would serve as the senior enlisted advisor.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CONCLUSIONS
The standing JSOTF headquarters staff will plan and train together as a unit. Their effectiveness as the core of a JSOTF headquarters will be measured by their ability to work effectively as a team from the very beginning of a crisis and even before the JSOTF is activated.
The TSOC should avoid dispersing the personnel of the standing JSOTF headquarters to the TSOC staff sections. If this happens, the standing JSOTF headquarters will cease to exist, and forming a JSOTF headquarters will remain nearly as painful for a TSOC as it is today.
The standing JSOTF headquarters architecture described in this section provides a minimal base that can expand into an effective JSOTF headquarters. The TSOC commander may choose to alter the task organization somewhat to better accomplish missions specific to his theater. The twenty-three positions, however, provide a template that USSOCOM can use to base requests for funding, personnel, equipment, and facility construction.
CONCLUSIONS
JSOTFs will continue to be substantially ad hoc organizations. Even with the core staff of a standing JSOTF headquarters, the majority of the personnel in a fully operational JSOTF headquarters will be augmentees. Standing JSOTF headquarters, though, will possess the experience and training to quickly form the JSOTF headquarters into a highly effective staff A standing JSOTF headquarters would give the TSOC commander more flexibility in his SOF command and control structure. Until standing JSOTF headquarters are fielded, TSOCs can get augmentation from National Guard Special Operations Detachments (SOD). Ideally deployed as a unit, they provide a trained, cohesive staff. SODs can work at any level from the TSOC to an ARSOTF. They do not offer all the benefits of a standing JSOTF headquarters, but they exist now and are an improvement over composite staffs.
The structure discussed in this paper is the minimum necessary to form an effective standing JSOTF headquarters. Ideally, each TSOC would have a fully manned standing JSOTF headquarters that required no augmentation when a crisis occurred. Unfortunately, such an organization would number one-hundred personnel or more, and is realistically not achievable. designed to train prospective commanders and staffs of JSOTFs. 35 Utilizing the SOF JTT soon after the standing JSOTF is fielded, followed immediately with a demanding exercise, would quickly develop the skills and teamwork essential to an effective JSOTF headquarters.
Forming standing JSOTF headquarters is a controversial issue. No unit or service is anxious to give up personnel to support an organization whose role is invisible to most except during a crisis. Some will contend that there is no real problem. JSOTFs formed in the past were ad hoc and they managed to get the job done. Our country, though, has now been attacked on its own shores and as a consequence, the nation is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism. Winning this war is our military's top priority, but to win it, we must be agile and global in depth. Standing JSOTF headquarters would give SOF an almost immediate command and control capability that would be effective at the earliest moments of an operation. They would provide this capability without detracting from the TSOC's ability to support other, perhaps simultaneous SOF operations in the theater. SOF will lead the military's war on terrorism.
USSOCOM and the TSOCs will orchestrate how SOF fights that war. Standing JSOTF headquarters are an important tool that will help the TSOCs command and control the fight.
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